This study explores the managerial perspectives towards open source software and networked innovation. We analysed six software companies who use open source software as a significant part of their product or service offering. The study found notable differences in managerial attitudes, expected benefits and key challenges related to open source software and its role in innovative activities. While all companies were using same pieces of software with open source communities, there were different levels of engagement in the development of the software and information flows between companies and communities. A deeper level of involvement enables the exchange of more than just the code: like ideas, influences, opinions and even innovations or parts of them. The differences in managerial views on open source and networked innovation may be explained by industry domains, value chain position and leadership style
innovators' and that there are significant differences between the two. The managers of the two kinds of companies view FLOSS differently, expect different operational benefits from it, face different challenges and, consequently, employ contradictory managerial techniques. For example, external innovators view FLOSS as a 'free lunch' and look solely for cost savings while, open innovations perceive FLOSS as a fundamental element of value creation and seek to become shapers of the technologies in question. Further, external innovators mostly attempt to 'work around' conflicts of interest with FLOSS communities, while open innovators seek to establish maximum synergy with them to reap the benefits of pooled R&D.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The second chapter summarises theoretical concepts underlying the study and explores how they compare to some models used in prior FLOSS literature. The third chapter describes the research approach and methods employed in this study, and also briefly introduces the case study companies. The fourth chapter presents the actual case study results and presents a brief summary of them. The fifth chapter discusses the limitations of the study and gives suggestions for further research. Conclusions close the paper.
Theoretical background 2.1 Three innovation models: closed, external and open
Over the past decades, co-operation and networks have come to the fore in innovation research (see e.g. Tuomi 2002 or Chesbrough 2006 for a historical review). Relatively recent ideas on the collaborative nature of innovation include, for example, the concepts of extended enterprise (Dyear 2000) , open innovation (Chesbrough 2003 ), user-driven innovation (von Hippel 2005 and creation nets (Hagel and Brown 2011) . This article builds mostly on Chesbrough's (2003 Chesbrough's ( , 2006 idea's on open innovation. His theory describes the recent tendency of companies to 'open up' their innovation processes. The main claim is that not all good ideas need to be developed internally, and not all ideas should necessarily be further developed within a firm's boundaries (ibid; Koskela et. al. 2011) . Two important characteristics of the Open Innovation theory are that it gives considerable attention to the purposive outbound flows of intellectual property (IP) and underlines the need to motivate the creation of relevant knowledge outside the company (ibid).
Based on Chesbrough (2003 Chesbrough ( , 2006 , West and Gallagher (2006a, 2006b ) acknowledge three innovation models: closed innovation, external innovation and open innovation. In the closed innovation model, internal research and development (R&D) activities feed the company's production pipeline and 
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Introduction
Various business models based on free and open source software (FLOSS) have been widely studied in academia (e.g. Bonaccorsi et. al. 2004 , Favaro and Pfleeger 2011 , Spiller and Wichmann 2002 , Lerner and Tirole 2002 . However, there seems to be relatively little research into why some open source companies take a very proactive role as FLOSS developers/advocates while others only use publicly available FLOSS resources and minimise any community involvement. This difference is not evident from FLOSS business-model literature because most known business models can be linked with either approach.
This study was born from a desire to understand key factors and determinants that turn companies into 'passive exploiters' or 'active contributors' in FLOSS. The focus is on analysing the difference in managerial perspectives towards open source and networked innovation. The selected research approach is a multiple case study of six software companies which all utilise FLOSS intensively but differ in terms of their engagement with FLOSS communities. Theory-wise, the study benefits from Chesbrough's (2003 Chesbrough's ( , 2006 open innovation paradigm and, more specifically, builds on the difference between 'external innovation' and 'open innovation' which was proposed by West and Gallagher (2004, 2006) . This paper claims that companies who actively contribute to FLOSS development have adapted the open innovation paradigm, while mere exploiters employ the external innovation model. Following Valkokari et. al. (2009) The term 'open innovation' is sometimes used to describe all scenarios where companies create profits from open source software. However, increasingly many software-intensive companies appropriate assets from FLOSS communities and use them to create proprietary products, without making any noticeable contributions back (Dahlander and Magnuson 2005; Stams 2009 ). Lacking steps to motivate the in-flows of external IP or to benefit from outbound IP flows, such an approach exemplifies the external -rather than open -innovation model (West and Gallagher 2006) . In contrast, the open innovation model entails some reciprocal interaction with FLOSS communities (ibid). Such reciprocity enables learning through co-creation (cf. Krogh et. al. 2003) products are brought to market by the company itself. In the external innovation model, the company seeks to develop what Cohen and Levithal (1989) Table 1 . Three innovation models summarised, modified from West and Gallagher (2004,2006) ander and Magnuson (2005) Grand et. al. (2004) and Dahlander (2007) propose four modes of company involvement in FLOSS. Grand et al. (2004) understands their four levels as 'progressive': each level implies bigger investments and a greater reliance on FLOSS, but also more operational benefits and improved opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning. As presented in Figure 1 
Other 'categorisations' of commercial FLOSS engagement
There are some prior studies which have aimed to categorise FLOSS companies according to the 'intensity' of their engagement with FLOSS communities. For example, Dahl- 
Data collection and analysis methods
The primary method of data collection was semi-structured interviews of company personnel. All interviews were literally transcribed. Other sources of evidence were online documentation and unobtrusive observation of employee interaction on FLOSS forums. These had a secondary role and were mainly used to collaborate and augment evidence collected in the interviews. In some cases, company partners were also contacted to confirm particular details. Qualitative method called Template Analysis was employed to thematically analyse the interview transcripts and, to a much smaller extent, some documentary evidence. In short, this means that a coding template was developed iteratively while the analytical process moved forwards. A short, initial version of the template reflected the pre-assumptions based on the theoretical frame while later versions were updated to reflect themes emerging from the data set. The final template served as a basis for interpreting the data and writing up the findings.
Case study results
This chapter in prior FLOSS literature. However, to our knowledge, this is the first article which studies the difference from the view point of innovation management. 
FLOSS as external innovation

Managerial attitudes and goals
External innovators did not perceive FLOSS communities as part of their value network -instead, publicly available source code was seen more like a 'bulk' resource on which to feed. They all saw free-of-charge software artefacts as the main 'gain' from FLOSS, underlining how cost and time savings had helped them to offer reduced prices, make bigger profit margins and/or achieve shorter lead times to market. They also recognised that the cost advantage was far from being marginal: a couple of companies said that they could never have entered a particular market without FLOSS. Considering the heterogeneity of the case study companies, it is hardly surprising that FLOSS has a different place in their innovation processes. For a couple of companies, FLOSS was a free-of-charge 'base brick' on which their own products were built. For example, a manager from company E explains, 'Open source is not value adding: it is simply a matter of getting the base software stack in a very mature state from day one and then you can concentrate on adding 
Managerial challenges
The first challenge mentioned for external innovators relates to exploration. Interestingly, several interviewees mentioned that it was very difficult to keep up-to-date on what is happening on the FLOSS scene. This was blamed on insufficient human resources internally or the need to keep all resources engaged in customer projects, leaving an impression that environmental scanning was seen secondary, after all. However, a senior specialist from company A expressed that his top-management should definitely pay more attention to the issue:
'We are pretty unorganised on this [scanning for FLOSSrelated innovation]... it is useless to go randomly surfing the Internet every Tuesday morning like "la di da, can't find anything here, let's try again next week" -instead, we should really have a carefully managed process for staying up-to-date on the latest FLOSS developments.'
The second challenge is to 'integrate external knowledge with own innovative activities'. On this area, the key issues for the interviewed companies related to quality assurance, legal liabilities and release maintenance. The quality-related challenges were very much in line with what has already been widely reported. It was underlined that FLOSS never provides any guarantees on quality and therefore each component has to go through an internal quality assurance and testing pipeline.
GPL i.e. GNU General Public Licence is one of the most wellknown and widely used FLOSS licenses. It is based the idea of 'copyleft' and is particularly strict in its requirements for developers to release the source code of derived or joint work (see e.g. Interestingly, even though interviewees emphasised challenges related to release maintenance, they could not name any concrete steps taken to address them. It seems that most took for granted that FLOSS projects are unpredictable/uncontrollable by 'nature' and this was just 'a risk to live with'. However, as a side note -the companies did share some of the same software development tools with communities, like GIT and Bugzilla.
FLOSS as open innovation
Managerial attitudes and goals
Open innovators had clearly different rationales for their FLOSS involvement. FLOSS communities were understood as an important part of the external value network and were deemed essential for global marketing, inter-organisational learning and joint development. Both companies B and D found most of their customers either through general vis-
The interviewees either did not know or did not openly admit it, but the described 'glue code' models are known to be 'grey' or borderline cases legally (e.g. Hopner 2004 ). They are clearly not 'safe' but reduce risks compared to boldly ignoring the GPL terms.
Managerial techniques
When asked about the affordability of non-direct investments, open innovators replied that whole-hearted FLOSS participation requires 'energy and passion' rather than big monetary investments. To exemplify such an attitude, their marketing director run a city marathon dressed as a blue elephant, a mascot of a well-known open source project, Postgre SQL. This earned the company five minutes of fame on a national TV channel. Once the CEO had contacted a local refugee centre and asked them to translate OpenOffice into an 'exotic' language. So, despite being a mediumsized company, they showed something that could be called 'community spirit'. While external innovators relied on the FLOSS enthusiasm of individual employees, the managers of open innovation companies were clearly the sources of such enthusiasm themselves.
Open innovators shared quality assurance concerns with external innovators, but adopted totally different techniques to address this challenge. First, they picked-up FLOSS software with a 'good reputation', they used their excellent social networks to accumulate knowledge on quality issues and made decisions on that basis. Secondly, they engaged some of their customers in the co-development and co-testing of products. The technical manager of company B says, 'The only way to test a product is to test with a customer and slowly start working to stabilise it... when I give software to them [certain customers] at a low cost, I can do some beta-testing, some R&D on them... this is how we bring in stable code.'
This was seen as an important continuum from FLOSS development practices which has always emphasised end-user involvement in R&D. This is just one example of the 'ways of doing things' adopted from FLOSS communities. Another example comes up when looking at how they respond to the aforementioned challenge of training new employees. In both companies B and D, employee training follows the classic 'onion model' (Ye at Kishida 2003) which is frequently used to describe how participative learning occurs in FLOSS communities. New employees started by following discussions on FLOSS forums and were encouraged to gradually deepen their participation and eventually make contributions of their own. Within FLOSS communities, new employees are 'coached' by external experts free-of-charge which supports in-house training efforts.
To fight against unwanted appropriation by competitors, the companies always used a GPL licence when giving out their own intellectual property. From the integration challenges mentioned previously, only quality assurance concerns were mentioned by open innovators. In stark contrast with external innovators, licence compatibility issues and other legal 'risks' were seen as fundamentally non-threatening due to close and friendly ties with legal copyright owners, i.e. the communities. The afore-mentioned problems on release maintenance were also eliminated: since base software was developed together with the community, there was no need to maintain a separate version for 'them' and 'us'. For open innovators, the biggest integration challenges related to developing the technical, social and business skills required by 'fully fledged' FLOSS involvement. Because such skills are not commonly taught in universities, they have to make significant investments in teaching the 'FLOSS ways' to new employees.
As to willing spill-outs and spin-offs, the biggest challenge named by open innovators were so called 'open source piracy'. This means that sometimes competing software companies appropriate the source code but illegally ignore the reciprocity terms of the FLOSS licence. This often means that potential benefits and 'credit' of the released IP goes to a competitor and nothing comes back to the original owner of the IP. This type of piracy was said to be common and it is exactly what some 'external innovators' in this study admitted to.
companies may indeed have contributed to a diversity of viewpoints, it also diminishes the value of analytical comparisons between the companies. Further, one of the key advantages of the case study approach is that 'rich' contextual information on the studied organisations can be provided (Chetty 1999; Bryman 2008) . However, in this study, such information is confined to few company characteristics presented in a table form; a more elaborate description of the companies could have improved the value of the findings and helped others to assess their transferability to other settings (Bryman 2008; Flyvbjer 2006) . Then, of course, there are the known limitations of the case study approach in general: even when multiple case studies are performed, the results cannot be generalised as such. With hindsight, qualitative interviews with a few dozen carefully selected companies could have better served our purpose than a multiple study design. On the other hand, intensive collaboration with a few organisations allowed us to build better 'rapport' with the interviewees and make them openly discuss sensitive issues such as legally 'shady' attempts to circumvent licensing terms. Further, we also find it interesting that certain clear regularities/similarities in management perspectives emerged despite the heterogeneity of the cases, suggesting that the proposed concepts do have some broader relevance.
Looking at the case study companies, we see that the companies with the most 'exploitative' relationship with FLOSS are embedded systems providers and positioned as subcontractors in the value chain. On the other hand, the companies which are most deeply involved in open innovation section 4.1.3), the companies saw it as a relatively efficient tool against unwanted appropriation (justifiably, see Hopner 2004).
Summary of the results
This study has explored managerial views on open source and networked innovation in six case study companies. The results are summarised in Table 3 . The study showed that there are fundamental differences in the managerial attitudes: while the management of external innovators clearly present an exploitation attitude and see FLOSS as a 'free ride ' to cost savings, the managers of companies with an open innovation approach see FLOSS as a fundamental element of their value creation process. Furthermore, open innovators clearly see FLOSS as a 'two-way street' of giving and receiving. There are also notable differences in the way the managers see the main challenges and in the way these challenges are tackled. For example, external innovators see the reciprocity demands of FLOSS licences, especially GPL, as a major obstacle and actively seek ways to work around it. Open innovators have a totally opposite view on the issue: they view open source piracy as a major challenge and see strong licensing schemes such as GPL, as a valid protection technique.
Discussion
There are problems in the methodological design of the study. With hindsight, the case study companies did not have enough common denominators: while the heterogeneity of 
Conclusions
The study investigated the management perspective towards open source collaboration and networked innovation in six software companies. From our empirical data, two opposite managerial views on community collaboration arose. The first view sees community participation as a cost or an unnecessary burden by the management. The open source community is seen as a resource pool of some kind, only in terms of a free-of-charge software artefact, and company interaction with the communities is limited to minimal. The second view is a complete opposite one, in this view collaboration with open source communities is seen as an investment. As a return of their investment, these companies expect opportunities for global marketing and inter-organisational learning as well as cost savings through pooled R&D. The latter view is compatible with the open innovation paradigm, while the former could be better described as 'external innovation'. The difference between the two managerial views could be explained in terms of industrial domain, value chain position, leadership style or even open source business models. More research is required to understand what causes a company to adopt either managerial perspective on FLOSS.
are software service providers with direct contact to end clients. For embedded systems providers, software forms a cost rather than a profit centre (cf. West 2007) and, thus, it might not be surprising that these companies stated cost savings as the biggest drivers for using open source software. Thus, even though 'widget frosting' can be considered as one of the most pivotal open source business models (e.g. Hecker 1999 , Henkel 2006 , in our study it not did seem to embrace innovations from community or interaction with the communities. For those companies who acted as subcontractors, contributing was also constrained by the fear of (customer's) sensitive information leaking out. In turn, the bespoke software companies that seemed more dependent on FLOSS communities as their main value proposition are focused around open source software. The core competence of these companies -services -is enhanced by the outside effects of open source and open innovation and there might be less threat of sensitive data or know-how leaking outside. It is obviously impossible to make conclusions in this regard based on six case studies, because the above relationships are probably incidental. However, the study suggest that differences in the value chain position and the related networked business models may create restrictions in the ways that open source can be applied. Beyond the software industry, prior studies (e.g. Savitskaya et. al. 2010 ) have found correlations between the value chain position and the 'openness' of innovation practices. It seems that more research is required to explore how the value chain position influences the companies' motivation and ability to contribute to FLOSS. One could also have deeper look at well-known open source business models to see whether they encourage a 'mindset' of exploitation or contribution. Because sustaining the pool of contributors is necessary for the long-term survival of the FLOSS phenomenon (cf. Hippel 2003, Dahlander and Magnuson 2005) , the question is hardly trivial. Alternatively, the difference between 'external innovators' and open innovators' could also be explained in terms of leadership (cf. Sanchez et. al. 2011) : the former seem to apply passive, and the latter, an active management approach towards FLOSS. For example, external innovators acknowledge the 'uncontrollability' of FLOSS as a given business risk while open innovators participate in FLOSS communities for the very reason of being able to control. For another example, external innovators passively rely on the enthusiasm of individual employees as FLOSS 'hobbyists', while top managers in open innovation companies are inputting their own 'energy and passion' in order to catalyse active FLOSS participation. The relationship between leadership style and FLOSS involvement might also be an interesting subject for further enquiry.
